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ABSTRACT: 
 
Although litigation involving sexual orientation and gender identity 
discrimination claims has generated considerable public attention in recent years, lesbian 
and transgender bodies and sexualities still remain largely invisible in Anglo-American 
courts. While such invisibility is generally attributed to social norms that fail to recognize 
lesbian and transgender experiences, the capacity to ‘not see’ or ‘not know’ queer bodies 
and sexualities also involves wilful acts of ignorance. Drawing from R v Hornick (2002) 
a Canadian case involving the police raid of a women’s bathhouse, this paper explores 
how lesbian and transgender bodies and sexualities are actively rendered invisible via 
legal knowledge practises, norms and rationalities. I argue that limited knowledge and 
limited thinking not only regulate the borders of visibility and belonging, but play an 
active part in shaping identities, governing conduct and producing subjectivity. 
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Despite the recent proliferation of high-profile cases involving sexual orientation 
and gender identity discrimination claims, lesbian and transgender bodies and sexualities 
remain largely invisible in Anglo-American courts (Lloyd, 2005; Smith, 1997; Whittle, 
2002; Boyd and Young, 2003). Even in Canada, where significant sexual orientation 
rights have been won, lesbians appear as disembodied, desexualized legal subjects 
(Valverde, 2006). Likewise, although transgender people are gaining increased legal 
protection from discrimination, their corporeal experiences and sexual identities remain 
largely unintelligible. For transgender persons, such invisibility results from federal and 
provincial legal frameworks that do not formally recognize gender identity as a distinct 
discrimination ground, and from social norms that marginalize gender variant-people 
(Durnford, 2005; Namaste, 2000; Ontario Human Rights Commission, 1999). For 
lesbians, legal invisibility is often attributed to similar social exclusion and to policing 
practises which historically criminalized lesbian sexuality less vigorously than gay men 
(Mason, 1995: 70-72; Robson, 1992; Valverde, 2007: 248). Indeed, lesbian sexuality is 
often assumed to fall below the radar of state surveillance.  Yet the capacity to ‘not see’ 
or ‘not know’ queer bodies and sexualities is not simply a matter of inadvertent omission, 
but involves wilful acts of ignorance. Particular facts must remain unspoken, details 
unquestioned, lines of thinking un-pursued—especially in the legal domain where 
selection of evidence is crucial to case outcomes. As such, I argue that discourses of 
limited knowledge and rationalities of ignorance play an active part in the legal 
disappearance of lesbian and transgender bodies and sexualities.  
Examining R v Hornick (2002) a Canadian case involving the police raid of a 
women’s bathhouse, this paper explores how lesbian, queer and transgender bodies and 
sexualities are actively rendered invisible via legal knowledge practises, norms and 
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rationalities. Resisting the temptation to see legal invisibility as simply the consequence 
of state indifference or repression, I suggest legal discourses and organizational 
rationalities constitute queer bodies and sexualities as unthinkable and unknowable. R v 
Hornick provides an important case study because lesbian and transgender bodies and 
sexualities were initially quite visible within the courtroom, but then dramatically 
disappeared in the final ruling. As such, lesbian and transgender bodies did not simply 
fall below the state’s radar, but were actively reconfigured as non-queer disembodied 
subjects. Drawing from governmentality literatures which examine ways of knowing as 
techniques of regulation, I suggest legal forms of limited knowledge and limited thinking 
regulate borders of (in)visibility, and play an active part in shaping identities, governing 
conduct and producing subjectivity. 
 
THE ‘PUSSY PALACE’ CASE 
On September 15, 2000, five male officers from Toronto Police Services entered a 
women’s sexual bathhouse at Club Toronto and proceeded to investigate for liquor 
licence violations and criminal sex acts. The sold-out event, known as the ‘Pussy Palace’ii 
was the fourth of its kind in Toronto and attracted several hundred patrons, the majority 
of whom were scantily clad when police arrived.  Police spent more than an hour on the 
premises, searching private rooms and questioning half-naked women, actions that were 
widely denounced by local press (Addis, 2000; Gallant, 2000; Giese, 2000; Gilbert, 
2000). Two members of the Toronto Women’s Bathhouse Committee were subsequently 
charged with several violations of Ontario’s Liquor Licence Act, including disorderly 
conduct and serving liquor outside prescribed areas and hours. When brought to court, 
however, Judge Peter Hryn dismissed the charges, ruling that police had violated the 
women’s security, privacy and equality rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
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Freedoms. Hryn deemed the police conduct analogous to a male-on-female strip search, 
which, in the absence of exigent circumstances, could not be justified. The police 
evidence was declared inadmissible and the charges withdrawn. 
Though hailed as a victory by the Bathhouse Committee, the ruling itself, as Bain 
and Nash (2007) argue, did not mark an entirely progressive decision for queer women’s 
sexuality. For both judge and defence, the key concern was neither the state’s efforts to 
monitor queer sexuality, nor the police abuse of liquor laws to do so, but simply that a 
search of semi-naked females was conducted by males. Why the women were naked, or 
what they were doing while naked was largely irrelevant to the court, as were their 
sexualities.  In fact, no where in the final judgment do the words ‘lesbian’, ‘queer’ or 
even ‘homosexual’ appear (Bain and Nash, 2007: 27). Likewise, despite considerable 
discussion during the court proceedings about the presence of transgender persons at the 
event (inclusive of male-to-female transwomen and female-to-male transmen), the words 
‘transgender’ or ‘transsexual’ were also nonexistent in the ruling. The absence of these 
terms is not trivial; such omission not only marks a gap in the legal representation of 
queer identities, but affects how the case is classified and read in future. If a law student 
conducts a Westlaw search using the term lesbian or transgender, for example, the case 
will not appear. The legal erasure of such identities is particularly striking in a context 
where promoting visibility of queer women’s sexuality was a clear objective of 
organizers (Gallant and Gillis, 2001: 153). An event originally designed to promote a 
public, transgressive, queer sexuality was tamed and desexualized by legal discourse in 
order to produce victims worthy of state protection. ‘In the end,’ argue Bain and Nash, 
‘the classic argument of the danger of the heterosexual male gaze on the defenceless and 
naked female body was successfully used by the state to contain the transgressive 
potential of queer spaces and queer identities’ (2007: 31). 
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It is tempting to see this case as an example of deliberate state repression of queer 
desire. Yet such a reading is too simplistic, for it assumes the case outcome was the direct 
result of state intentions, and fails to interrogate the conditions that made such power 
effects possible. Further examination suggests the police actions were a culmination of 
social, institutional and political forces, rather than a singular ideological mission by a 
monolithic state (Lamble, 2006). Moreover, the key legal arguments that effectively 
contained transgressive bathhouse sexuality were not initiated by the state, but were 
brought forth by the lawyer representing the Bathhouse Committee, thereby raising 
questions about the conditions in which subjects participate (albeit strategically) in their 
own regulation. Such regulation arguably arose in part from appealing to a human rights 
framework, which, despite its benefits, relies on universal humanity claims that often 
erase lesbian and transgender specificities. Invisibility also emerged from right to privacy 
arguments, which required that queer women’s bodies and sexualities find their ‘proper’ 
place in a private rather than public realm (Bain and Nash, 2007: 24-26). Given the 
legacy of failed privacy claims for queers (e.g. Bowers v Hardwick, and R v Brown), the 
successful deployment of privacy rights in the Bathhouse case is laudable, but 
nevertheless reinforced conservative gender norms. The court’s capacity to employ 
liberal rhetoric while simultaneously confining queer bodies and sexualities is therefore 
best understood through a governmentality lens, which recognizes how regulation 
operates through individual freedoms (Rose, 1999/2004).  
 
LESBIAN AND TRANSGENDER LEGAL INVISIBLITIY 
Despite the longstanding legal invisibility of lesbian bodies and sexualities, 
explanations for such absences are surprisingly under-explored. Conventional wisdom 
suggests that lesbian sexuality poses less threat to heterosexual norms than gay male 
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sexuality, such that lesbians fall below the radar of state policing.  Indeed, while gay male 
sexuality has been historically criminalized by anti-sodomy laws, same-sex acts among 
women have generated less state interest.iii In England and Wales, for example, lesbians 
could not be prosecuted under buggery laws that criminalized gay men.iv This legacy 
extends to Canada (and the US), where anti-sodomy laws technically applied to women, 
but were rarely enforced (Valverde, 2007: 233, 248). Noting the relatively few cases of 
criminalized lesbianism is not to suggest that female-female eroticism has been 
unregulated by the state; such legal silences may constitute a deliberate attempt to 
regulate lesbian sexuality through denial of its existence (Mason, 1995: 71; Robson, 
1992). Family law rulings, welfare provision, civil service and military employment mark 
other areas where lesbians have been highly regulated by the state (Millbank, 1997; 
Arnup, 1989; Kinsman, 1996). However, since state efforts to regulate lesbian sexuality 
have been largely manifest within non-criminal and non-legal domains, lesbians have 
made few public appearances in Canadian legal history. 
Even since the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which 
ushered in a new era of gay rights litigation, lesbians are surprisingly absent. Of the 
thirteen Supreme Court decisions to date that reference the word ‘lesbian,’ only one 
significant case (M. v. H, 1999) directly involved lesbians. The remaining cases fall into 
one of three groupings: (1) cases that address published representations of gays and 
lesbians rather than embodied persons (e.g. Surrey School District, 2001; Little Sisters, 
2000); (2) cases that make passing reference to the sexual orientation of suspects or  
witnesses in criminal proceedings (e.g. R. v. O.N.E, 2001; R v. Davis, 1999); or (3) cases 
that simply reference lesbians within a generic, abstract homosexuality that is 
indistinguishable from gay men (e.g. Trinity Western, 2001; Hodge, 2004; North 
Vancouver School District, 2005; Granovsky 2000).  The key Charter cases that address 
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sexual orientation claims involve gay men, with rulings that impact lesbians, but do not 
directly represent them (e.g. Mossop, 1993; Vriend, 1998; Egan, 1995). Even the 2004 
Supreme Court reference on same-sex marriage did not involve actual same-sex couples 
and the words ‘lesbian,’ ‘gay,’ or ‘sexuality’ were absent from the decision (Reference 
Re: Same Sex Marriage, 2004).  
Where lesbians do appear before Canadian courts, they are constituted as 
disembodied, desexualized legal subjects (Valverde, 2006). The most prominent Supreme 
court case involving a lesbian couple, M v H (1999), made virtually no reference to the 
sexual aspect of the litigants’ relationship. Although the key question was whether or not 
the same-sex couple’s legal status was equivalent to a heterosexual common law 
relationship, the case was framed as a property dispute.  The sexual nature of their 
relationship was not discussed (Valverde, 2006: 162). Not only was their sexuality 
missing; their bodies were absent too. Although customary to use initials to protect 
litigants’ anonymity, the initials M and H did not even refer to the litigants’ own names, 
but to their respective lawyers (M for Martha McCarthy and H for Julia Holland).v In 
their extended anonymity, M and H mark another example of disembodied, desexualized 
lesbians. 
The absence of lesbian bodies and sexualities in law is partly an effect of legal 
strategy and partly a consequence of the legal conceptualization of ‘sexual orientation.’  
Gay and lesbians litigants are unlikely to reveal intimate sexual details, lest such 
information jeopardize their legitimacy in court. Same-sex couples are desexualized or 
treated as heterosexual-like; any references to sexual relations are framed as evidence of 
long-term, stable, loving, spousal relationships (see for example, K (Re), 1995). De-
sexing and disembodiment function as both condition of receiving equal treatment and 
prerequisite for intelligibility (Cooper, 2006). Sexual orientation itself tends to be 
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desexualized in Canadian law, treated more like a socio-cultural group than a sexual 
identity (Valverde, 2006: 106; Boyd and Young, 2003).  
Transgender bodies and sexualities have also remained largely invisible in 
Canadian law. While courts have historically scrutinized transgender bodies with respect 
to marriage cases (where the capacity for penile-vaginal penetration, whether functional 
or aesthetic, provided a key threshold for legal recognition of gender identity), such cases 
generally treat transgender persons as biological, medical and psychological ‘specimens,’ 
rather than fully-embodied legal subjects (Sharpe, 2007; Whittle, 2002). Although 
legalization of same-sex marriage has rendered moot the Canadian applicability of some 
of this older case law, it has not resolved issues of invisibility, since legal recognition of 
transgender relationships can conflict with couple’s self-defined identities. For example, 
a transgender (male-to-female) woman is now eligible to marry a non-transgender man, 
but the state will likely recognize the relationship as same-sex, even if the couple 
identifies as heterosexual (Cowan, 2005: 81). Similarly, although the 2004 UK Gender 
Recognition Act enables transgender persons to obtain legal status in their self-identified 
gender, recognition is conditional on dissolution of any previous marriage (Sharpe, 2007: 
70). While these frameworks mark an improvement over other jurisdictions—such as 
Germany, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and some U.S. states—where sterilization 
is a precondition for identity recognition, UK and Canadian law nonetheless obscures 
transgender sexualities and relationships (Whittle, 2002: 162). 
Most Canadian provinces also require evidence of sex-reassignment surgery for a 
legal change of sex, thereby excluding individuals who do not choose, or are unable to 
access, medical interventions. Further, because both federal and provincial human rights 
legislation in Canada (with the exception of the Northwest Territories) does not formally 
recognize gender identity as a specific category of discrimination, transgender persons 
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must graft their claims to other grounds (such as sex, sexual orientation or disability), 
which fail to address the specificity of transgender issues (Durnford, 2005). To date, no 
case specifically involving transgender issues has reached the Supreme Court of Canada, 
despite vital appeals by transgender persons to have their cases heard (e.g. Nixon v 
Vancouver Rape Relief, 2007). 
Visibility is particularly fraught for transgender persons, adding further 
complexity to questions of legal erasure.  For many transgender people, visibility is not in 
fact desirable, as it often signals a failure to ‘pass’ in one’s self-defined gender.  
Particularly if one has undergone the state’s arduous legal and medical requirements of 
transitioning, successful passing can be liberating.  Passing is also a safety issue, since 
transpeople are at high risk of harassment and violence. Yet passing carries the burden of 
secrecy and fear of discovery. Visibility thus poses a dilemma for many transgender 
persons, as tensions arise between wanting to pass and wanting to be acknowledged 
(Green, 1999). These tensions become more acute as transgender issues come to court, 
because transpeople simultaneously experience hypervisibility, and stark invisibility, 
since legal narratives and media spectacle often prevent transpeople from fully 
representing themselves and their experiences (Whittle, 1999). For example, while 
transgender persons are disproportionately criminalized and imprisoned, the concerns and 
experiences of transgender prisoners have received scant public attention (Findlay, 1999; 
Mann, 2006). When transgender identities are acknowledged, it usually without 
recognizing the material, embodied experiences of transgender lives (Namaste, 2000).  
R v Hornick marks both departure from, and adherence to, the standard legal 
treatment of lesbian and transgender bodies and sexualities. Generating mainstream news 
coverage and attracting sold-out crowds, women’s bathhouse events were by no means 
below the police radar (Gallant and Gillis, 2001: 153-4). When police entered the 
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premise, physical bodies were the primary target of surveillance, with officers counting 
each of the 330 semi-nude bodies in attendance. Likewise, lesbian and transgender bodies 
were initially visible in the courtroom. Defence lawyer Frank Addario asked each 
bathhouse witness detailed questions about her body: how exactly she was clothed (‘how 
were you dressed that evening?); the degree of bodily exposure (‘nude or partially 
nude?’), the visibility of particular areas of the body; (‘was your chest area covered?’); 
what type of material was worn (‘by sheer, do you mean see through?’); and the exact 
position of women’s towels on their bodies (‘you wrapped it around below your armpit?’ 
‘It came just to the top of your thighs?’) (R v Hornick Proceedings, 22 Oct 2001: 22, 28, 
65, 66). Police described explicit sex acts among women at the bathhouse, including 
‘genital rubbing’ and ‘penetration’ (R v Hornick Proceedings, 23 Oct 2001: 31, 33). The 
physical bodies of transgender persons also garnered significant attention, with a police 
witness even describing in detail the genital area of one patron, referring to a ‘slight bulge 
in the underwear’ as evidence of biological maleness (R v Hornick Proceedings, 23 Oct 
2001: 34, 54, 57).  While the officer did not consider the ‘bulge’ in question could have 
been a strap-on dildo (common attire at women’s bathhouses), such attention to queer 
corporeality nonetheless evoked a striking image in court. Although bathhouse bodies 
and sexualities eventually transformed into disembodied, desexualised legal subjects, 
they were initially visible in very explicit and corporeal ways.  
Making queer women’s sexuality visible was, in fact, a clear goal of the Pussy 
Palace (Gallant and Gillis, 2001: 153).  Promoting such visibility not only required 
physical space, but also conceptual space. As two organizers describe, the bathhouse 
‘created new possibilities for how women could think about, organize, and enact their 
sexual desires. Whether or not women attended the Pussy Palace, it existed as an option, 
as a possibility, as a problem for how women think of themselves as sexual beings’ 
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(Gallant and Gillis, 2001: 153). Yet the court’s capacity to think, know, and see queer 
bodies and sexualities on such terms proved difficult. As the courtroom drama unfolded, 
bathhouse patrons were transformed from public, active, queer subjects to private, 
passive, heterosexual victims. The construction of such bodies was not simply a 
consequence of the judge’s decision, but also the product of entrenched legal rationalities 
that rendered queer bodies and sexualities unthinkable and unknowable. 
 
GOVERNING THROUGH KNOWING / UNKNOWING 
Governmentality, simply stated, concerns the conduct of conduct (Dean, 
1999/2006: 10; Rose, 1999/2004: 3; Gordon, 1991: 2; Foucault, 1991).  As Nikolas Rose 
describes, governmentality includes ‘all endeavours to shape, guide, direct the conduct of 
others’ (Rose, 1999/2004: 3). Governing in this sense does not function through 
repressive force, but, ‘seeks to shape our conduct by working through our desires, 
aspirations, interests and beliefs’ (Dean, 1999/2006: 11). Hence, governmental power 
works through individual freedom (Rose, 1999/2004). This capacity to shape conduct is 
contingent on particular knowledge practises, since working through individual desires 
requires knowledge of the subject to be guided and the conditions that foster intended 
conduct.  Mitchell Dean describes four dimensions of governing, each linked to ways of 
knowing:  1) forms of visibility, which emerge from particular ways of seeing and 
perceiving; 2) modes of thinking and questioning, which rely on specific vocabularies 
and rationalities for producing truth; 3) techniques of acting, intervening and directing, 
which are comprised of practical rationalities, expertise and ‘know how’; 4) modes of 
forming subjects, which elicit, foster and attribute various capacities, statuses and 
orientations to particular agents (Dean, 1999/2006: 23, 30-32).  Collectively, these modes 
 12 
of knowledge shape the capacity to conduct ourselves and others (Dean, 1999/2006). In 
short, governing operates through knowing. 
But what if unknowing or limited knowing also function as a regulatory 
techniques?  How might discourses of ignorance works to produce certain kinds of 
subjects, orders, and power relations (Cooper, 2006)? No doubt, unknowing is 
inextricably bound with knowing as there are few clear boundaries for determining where 
knowing begins and ends. But what if a focus on unknowing reveals something different 
than what attention to knowing can yield? 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick raises such questions in claiming that ‘ignorance is as 
potent and as multiple a thing there as is knowledge’ (Sedgwick, 1990: 4). Quoting 
Foucault, she notes, ‘there is no binary division to be made between what one says and 
what one does not say; we must try to determine the different ways of not saying such 
things. There is not one but many silences, and they are an integral part of the strategies 
that underlie and permeate discourse’ (Sedgwick, 1990: 3). In other words, ignorances 
‘are produced by and correspond to particular knowledges and circulate as part of 
particular regimes of truth’ (Sedgwick, 1990: 8). Drawing from Sedgwick and Foucault, 
but broadening the category of ignorance to incorporate other forms of limited thought, I 
explore how limited knowing/thinking play a significant role in the governmentality of 
lesbian and transgender legal subjects. By limited knowing/thinking I refer to stoppages, 
gaps, limits and refusals upon thinking and knowing that occur within a particular logic 
or rationality, including: explicit references to what one doesn’t know; deliberate and less 
intentional refusals to know or think; logics and norms which render some facts as 
relevant and others as easily cast aside.  
 Limited thinking is not simply the opposite of knowing, nor a partial fragment of 
a more pure logic or authentic mode of thought. As Donna Haraway reminds us, all 
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knowledges are situated and partial, meaning they are bound by the time, place and 
particular location of the subject making knowledge claims (Haraway, 1991). Nor is 
limited thinking synonymous with irrationality. If rationality, in a governmentality sense, 
refers to deployments of knowledge that enable an activity to become thinkable and 
practicable (whether a theoretical framework, political paradigm, or pragmatic method), 
then limited thinking—which achieves similar results by rendering particular activities 
unthinkable and impractical—can be understood as a kind of inverse or hyper-rationality 
(Dean, 1999/2006: 211; Foucault, 1991: 96; Rose, 1999/2004: 24-28). Such limited 
thinking reflects what Linsey McGoey, drawing from Nietzsche, describes as the ‘will to 
ignorance’ within bureaucracies—a tendency to deploy ignorance strategically for highly 
functional outcomes (McGoey, 2007: 213, 228). Investigating the utility of limited 
thinking as a conceptual tool, I hope to make visible knowledge-power relations that 
might otherwise be taken for granted. This task should not be confused with a polemic 
against judicial ignorance, whereby lesbian and transgender people are positioned to 
enlighten judges (although I am not ruling out such a strategy either); rather, it is an 
attempt to interrogate the conditions which make certain kinds of ignorance possible and 
with what effect. 
I locate limited thinking within the realm of social practise, rather than individual 
psyches. Limited thinking of individual agents (e.g. police, lawyers, judges) for example, 
is not simply the product of an autonomous rationality, but is sculpted and invoked by 
specific governing regimes (e.g., administrative rules, bureaucratic culture, duties and 
obligations) that compel agents to self-identify in particular ways, to ask some questions 
and not others, and to use particular forms of knowledge that foreclose upon others. Such 
techniques structure a field of vision that illuminates certain objects, while shadowing 
and obscuring others (Dean, 1999/2006: 32). 
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Multiple forms of limited thinking/knowing were deployed throughout the 
bathhouse case: lack of thought; refusal to know and think; self-proclaimed ignorance; 
limited reasoning.  These manifestations of limited thinking were not uniform, but served 
different purposes and created varied effects, whether providing a means to avoid self-
reflexivity, evade responsibility, claim innocence, provide distance from dangerous 
knowledge, maintain norms, or perpetuate hierarchies. Limited knowing was not a 
sporadic imperfection in logic, but played a vital role in the police capacity to carry out 
the raid, the lawyer’s capacity to defend and the judge’s capacity to rule. Below, I 
examine three examples: first, careless thinking on the part of the police officers carrying 
out the raid, second, limited thinking of both judge and defence lawyer in upholding the 
ban on cross-gender strip searches; and third, the judge’s refusal to know when 
determining matters of relevance. 
 
Queerly Unthinking Cops: The Privilege of Unknowing 
Discourses of limited thinking played a key role in the police justification for 
using male officers to search a women’s bathhouse. As Lead Detective Dave Wilson 
testified in court, it did not occur to him that using male officers might be upsetting for 
bathhouse patrons; he simply assumed entitlement to gaze upon semi-naked bodies (R v 
Hornick Proceedings, 23 Oct 2001: 82, 90, 118). Here, lack of thought denotes 
carelessness. Wilson’s actions reflect lack of attentiveness, failure to deliberate, 
negligence, and obliviousness. Whether Wilson actually failed to consider the feelings of 
bathhouse patrons or simply dismissed them, he used discourses of careless thought as an 
alibi (i.e., ‘I didn’t know I was causing harm’). These claims of ignorance, which 
Sedgwick calls ‘the privilege of unknowing,’ are not simply a lack of knowledge, but an 
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epistemological position which enables otherwise unacceptable practises to occur 
(Sedgwick, 1990: 5; Howe, 2000).  
Wilson’s ignorance also blurred into wilful unknowing.  When asked why he did 
not seek additional female officers to conduct the raid, Wilson again claimed limited 
knowledge:   
Addario [Lawyer]:  Would you agree with me that the investigation 
conducted by the men on your crew could have been conducted equally 
well by qualified female members of the Toronto Police Service? 
Wilson:  I don’t think so 
Addario:  Why not? 
Wilson:  I knew the capabilities of these officers that were with me at the 
time.  I couldn’t certainly speak to the officers that you’re speaking of, 
somebody’s who’s qualified, that doesn’t necessarily mean they’ve got the 
same professionalism, integrity that my officers did….. 
Addario: Are you telling us that there were no female members of the 
force who would qualify to conduct the type of investigation that was done 
that evening? 
Wilson:  Qualified, no I wouldn’t know.  There may have been. 
Addario:  You don’t know because you didn’t call around to see who was -
- available. 
Wilson: Correct… 
Addario: --what I’m asking you about is whether or not you’re suggesting 
that there aren’t woman on the Toronto Police Service who are capable of 
behaving professional and with integrity on an investigation? 
Wilson:  Perhaps. 
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Addario:  You just don’t know? 
Wilson:  That’s right.  (R v Hornick Proceedings, 23 Oct 2001: 90-91, 95)  
Wilson’s limited knowledge serves multiple functions in this exchange.  Wilson relies on 
his own ignorance (not knowing if there were qualified female officers) to justify using 
male rather than female officers.  His logic is also contingent upon an association 
between uncertainty and risk; Wilson claims that choosing male officers he ‘knows’ is a 
better guarantor of professionalism than seeking female officers who he ‘doesn’t know.’ 
Uncertainty serves another function in this passage: evasiveness.  Claiming to be unaware 
if there were qualified female officers, Wilson attempts to sidestep Addario’s accusations 
of sexism.  
Wilson’s reliance on tensions between knowing and unknowing proved crucial to 
the rationale that officially governed his actions. When further questioned on his decision 
to conduct the raid with male officers, Wilson testified that his officers had a ‘special 
knowledge’ of the Church Wellesley Community, an area in downtown Toronto known 
as the ‘gay village’ (R v Hornick Proceedings, 23 Oct 2001: 91).vi Wilson noted his 
officers had several years experience in the community, having undertaken previous 
investigations at local establishments, namely the Bijou Club and the Barn (men’s sex 
bars).  Wilson claimed this experience gave his officers special ‘expertise,’ ‘where other 
qualified…officers, scholastically might be prepared to do a liquor inspection, [but] 
practically speaking they wouldn’t do as good a job’ (R v Hornick Proceedings, 23 Oct 
2001: 90, 93). Yet Wilson’s logic was spectacularly circular, revealing a striking 
combination of naïve ignorance and blind hubris. According to Wilson, if women went to 
a bathhouse where there is sex but no men, they must be lesbians; if they were lesbians, 
they must be from the Church and Wellesley community; if from Church and Wellesley, 
then expertise about gay male residents in the area applies (R v Hornick Proceedings, 23 
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Oct 2001: 90-93). It did not occur to Wilson that non-lesbian-identified women might 
have sex with other women, that lesbians (or other bathhouse patrons) reside outside the 
Church Wellesley area, or that lesbians might require different policing tactics than gay 
men. For Wilson, the ability to conduct a proper investigation came not simply from 
knowing the law, but from knowing his target subjects, even if that knowledge was 
blatantly spurious. 
So well did Wilson ‘know’ the bodies of the bathhouse patrons, he claimed not to 
be looking at them at all. Indeed, Wilson and his officers did not consider the 
investigation to be equivalent to a strip search; officers claimed to be searching a space 
rather than bodies (R v Honick, 2002: para 61). Wilson described himself as undertaking 
a ‘verbal liquor inspection’ as though he questioned women without looking at their 
bodies (R v Hornick Proceedings, 23 Oct 2001: 71). Evident here are key tensions 
between knowing and not knowing: Wilson emphasized his ‘expertise’ regarding the 
Church-Wellesley community to justify the inspection, but simultaneously claimed not to 
know what would occur at the bathhouse to counter the argument that he should have 
known to send female officers.  Both his expertise and his ignorance served as the 
‘rational’ foundation to justify his actions.  
 
Limited Thinking in the Courtroom: Upholding the Cross-gender Search Ban 
The crux of the final ruling in R v Hornick lays in a simple legal ban on cross-
gender searches, whereby men cannot strip search women and vice versa. Yet the 
capacity to apply this principle in the bathhouse case required wilful ignorance of the 
rationale behind such a ban, as well as deliberate bracketing of sexual and gender 
identities. Judge Hryn never elaborated on the reasons for the ban; he simply proclaimed 
‘policy and law clearly sets out that a male on female strip search is wrong’ (R v Hornick, 
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2002: para 83). The policy and law referenced by Hryn offers little elucidation; neither 
the acts, case law nor academic articles provide any explanation for the ban on cross-
gender searches (R v Mattis, 1998, R v Flintoff, 1998, Newman, 1999). Even the Arbour 
Inquiry, which dealt specifically with male-on-female searches, provides no clear 
rationale, other than a vague reference to societal intolerance for the presence of ‘non-
intimate members of the opposite sex during the performance of private functions’ 
(Arbour Inquiry, 1996: section 2.4).vii  
Only one case sheds light on the reasons for the prohibition, but it noted within a 
Toronto Police Services report, and not directly cited by Hryn (Lyons, 1999: 4-5).  In 
Conway v. Attorney-General of Canada (also cited as Weatherall), the Supreme court 
recognized differential power relations among men and women as well as the ‘historical 
trend’ of male violence against women as a justification for prohibiting men from 
searching women in prison, but not vice versa (Weatherall, 1993). However, Weatherall, 
is not considered authoritative on searches, as it concerned ‘pat-down’ searches (rather 
than strip searches, which were the issue in Hornick) and it involved prisoners who have 
reduced privacy rights. Moreover, the strip-search policies applicable in Hornick were 
implemented subsequent to the Weatherall decision and prohibit all cross-gender strip 
searches, not just searches of women by men. 
On the surface then, ‘gender’ functions as the official regulatory boundary for the 
strip-search policy. Yet, as Judge Hryn’s comments made clear, ‘sexuality’ is also at 
stake. Hryn not only ruled that the bathhouse raid constituted the ‘functional equivalent 
of a strip search’ but likened male officers’ conduct to ‘visual rape’ (R v Hornick, 2002: 
para 45, 80). Hryn did not denote a particular way of looking as the source of the rights 
breach (e.g., police ogled patrons); rather, the violation arose simply because male 
officers had seen semi-nude women without consent. Implicit in the rape analogy is a 
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presumed heterosexuality; the male gaze upon the female body is deemed dangerous 
because it is sexualized. Hence, it is not simply gender that governs the ban on cross-
gender searches, but also sexuality.   
Yet this sexuality-based rationale is limited in so far as it cannot reconcile non-
heterosexualities. If, for example, the male officers were gay and sexuality uninterested 
in the women, would the gaze be considered benign and the search considered lawful? 
Conversely, would the gaze of a lesbian police officer upon a lesbian body constitute a 
similar form of ‘visual rape’? One of the undercover officers who investigated the 
bathhouse prior to the arrival of the male officers, did in fact identify as lesbian, thus 
disrupting the ban’s heteronormative logic (Millar, 2002). Here a paradox emerges, for 
the court draws upon sexuality to justify the ban on cross-gender searches, but cannot 
consider sexuality outside of heteronormativity, lest its logic unravel. Applying the ban 
thus requires that non-heterosexuality become invisible and unintelligible. 
The application of the cross-gender ban is further challenged by presence of 
transgender men at the bathhouse. If the ban is taken seriously, then male officers could 
not conduct the search as it would violate the rights of female patrons, and female 
officers could not conduct the search, as it would violate the rights of male-identified 
transgender patrons. Since both male-to-female transwomen and female-to-male 
transmen were present at the bathhouse, the search paradox arises regardless of how one 
legally recognizes transgender identity. Hence, even if sexuality is set aside, a purely 
gender-based prohibition is troubled by the presence of transgender persons.viii 
Accordingly, the court could not formally recognize the presence of transgender men at 
the bathhouse; transmen had to be absorbed into the female social body.ix 
Unpacking the ban on cross-gender searches reveals what feminists, transgender 
and queer theorists have long argued: namely that sex, gender and sexuality are not 
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discrete categories, but are inextricably bound up with one another, each concept relying 
on the others for its logic. The rationale of ban thereby functions only when given 
coherence through a male/female binary governed by a presumed heterosexuality. Queer 
and transgender identities exceed the ban’s logic, thereby becoming legally unintelligible.  
 
Matters of legal ‘relevance’:  Refusing to know, Unwilling to think  
Don’t ask; You shouldn’t know. It didn’t happen; it doesn’t make any 
difference; it didn’t mean anything; it doesn’t have interpretive 
consequences. Stop asking just here; stop asking just now…it makes no 
difference; it doesn’t mean (Sedgwick, 1990: 53). 
While Detective Wilson relied on discourses of ‘ignorance’ to justify his actions, 
the judge could not make similar claims.  Since the presence of transgender persons and 
the sexuality of bathhouse patrons were explicitly discussed during the witness 
proceedings, the court was well-informed of these facts. To exclude these matters, 
however, the court need not render them unintelligible; the judge could simply dismiss 
such details as irrelevant. To render sexuality as inconsequential rather than inappropriate 
sidesteps controversies over imposed morality and reinstalls claims of judicial 
objectivity. Perhaps seeking to avoid potential accusations of homophobia (under the 
assumption that if one does not acknowledge identity-based differences, one cannot be 
accused of discriminating against them), the judge did not want to utter the word lesbian 
in court (Valverde, 2003: 71, 82, 97).  Indeed, Hryn expressed discomfort stating aloud 
the words ‘Pussy Palace’, perhaps symptomatic of another kind of unknowing – a 
deliberate distancing from knowledge that ‘one doesn’t know because one shouldn’t 
know’ (Cooper, 2006: 934). Such epistemological distancing also characterises the 
rationale of ‘relevance’ albeit in less moralistic terms. Deciding something is irrelevant 
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marks an intentional setting aside of knowledge, a deliberate refusal to know or consider. 
Irrelevant details are purposefully cast aside lest they confuse, complicate or contaminate 
more significant facts. Accordingly, the curious absence of references in the final ruling 
to transgender, lesbian and queer sexuality would seem perfectly reasonable to the court: 
such details were simply inconsequential.  
Indeed, one might argue that the presence of trans people at the bathhouse was 
legally irrelevant because the individuals charged were not (according to the court) trans-
identified.  The crown made a similar claim, arguing the defendants were never seen by 
male officers in a state of undress and therefore could not to seek remedy under the 
Charter. However, Judge Hryn rejected this argument, stating that the expectation of 
privacy was not limited to the organizer’s personal state of dress, but extended to the 
event as a whole. According to Hryn, the event ‘by definition would have nude or 
partially nude women present exploring their sexuality with the expectation that men 
were excluded’ (R v Hornick, 2002: para 54). Hyrn’s language choice is significant; he 
carefully extends privacy rights to other patrons, while sidestepping any reference to 
transgender persons. Whether Hryn deliberately excluded transgender people here, or 
simply failed to consider their presence, the effect is the same; transgender bodies were 
located outside the realm of thinkability, and thereby rendered invisible.  
No doubt the judge would deny he had engaged in any form of censorship. In one 
sense this is correct, for the judgment does not constitute conventional repression of 
queer gender and sexuality. Ultimately, the ruling chastised police rather than bathhouse 
patrons. However, the court’s refusal to speak about queer bodies and sexualities reflects 
a more subtle kind of prohibition, one perhaps more insidious. Limited thought did not 
take the form of ‘irrational’ homophobia or explicitly transphobic logic, but arose within 
carefully argued legal rationalities. The very act of sorting through evidence, a crucial 
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component of any judgment, marked a form of limited thinking that is deeply imbedded 
within legal processes. Such modes of thinking foreclose upon particular questions before 
they are even asked. The danger of such epistemological prohibition lies in its apparent 
reasonableness.  
 
CONCLUSION 
R v Hornick provides an important case study for examining the legal regulation 
of bodies and sexualities through modes of invisibility and unthinkability, particularly 
because Canada is frequently revered for its embrace of lesbian, gay and (to a lesser 
extent) transgender rights. However, these trends arguably persist elsewhere. The West 
Australian Gender Reassignment Act 2000, for example, offers legal protection to post-
operative transgender persons, but excludes those who are pre- and non-operative, thus 
rendering them legally invisible (Sharpe, 2002: 189). The UK’s Gender Recognition Act 
2004 does not necessarily demand surgery, but requires ‘permanent crossing’ from one 
gender to another, thereby denying recognition to transgender persons who shift between 
or contest the male/female binary (Sandland, 2005: 48-50; Sharpe, 2007: 71). In the US, 
current federal prison policy refuses to recognize any gender change (such that 
transgender men are placed in women’s prisons and transgender woman are placed in 
men’s prisons at huge risk to their safety) signalling a particularly violent form of denial 
(Spade, 2008 forthcoming). The numerous jurisdictions that have annulled marriages 
involving transgender persons provide further examples of wilful ignorance. Unlike 
divorce, which declares the end of a marital relationship, annulment denies one ever 
existed (Flynn, 2006: 39). The UK Civil Partnership Act 2004 extends a marriage model 
to same-sex couples, but does so on the condition of sexual erasure; the act removes the 
consummation requirement and excludes adultery as grounds for divorce. The 
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government noted that consummation and adultery each have ‘a specific meaning within 
the context of heterosexual relationships and it would not be possible nor desirable to 
read this across to same-sex civil partnerships’ [my emphasis] (quoted in Stychin, 2006: 
907). Although the absence of sex in the Act may be politically desirable for other 
reasons (see Barker, 2006), the legal ‘impossibility’ of same-sex consummation and 
adultery arguably marks a refusal to think sex beyond heterosexual penetration (Stychin, 
2006: 907). These examples suggest that despite winning important legal gains, lesbian 
and transgender bodies and sexualities often remain unthinkable in law. 
Although I have mapped the ways in which limited thinking and knowing produce 
invisibility as both effect and mode of regulation, I do not wish to suggest that promoting 
visibility is a necessary or desirable antidote. Indeed, queer visibility in the legal domain 
has often led to criminalization and social stigma. The infamous R v Brown (1993), which 
involved private consensual acts of sadomasochism among gay men, provides a UK case 
in point, where the hypervisibility of gay male sexuality not only invoked a pathologized 
queer body, but resulted in job loss, social hardship and imprisonment (Moran, 1995: 
225; Stychin, 1995: chapter 7). Even when legal visibility does not invoke punishment, 
recognition-based politics can facilitate other undesirable consequences, such as 
assimilation of transgressive practises or entrenchment of new normative hierarchies. In 
this sense, ‘Visibility is a trap; it summons surveillance and the law; it provokes 
voyeurism, fetishism, the colonialist/imperial appetite for possession’ (Phelan, 1998: 6). 
More importantly, as Evelynn Hammonds argues, ‘visibility in and of itself does not 
erase a history of silence nor does it challenge the structure of power and domination, 
symbolic and material, that determines what can and cannot be seen’ (Hammonds, 1994: 
141). Accordingly, a bathhouse judgment that recognized the embodied, sexual identities 
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of lesbian and transgender patrons may not have been more politically advantageous than 
the judgment that was delivered. 
Moreover, the boundaries between visibility and invisibility, and between 
thinkability and unthinkabily are highly fraught, with unpredictable and often conflicting 
effects. The bathhouse raid generated public attention, which furthered the organizers’ 
goal of making queer sexuality more visible, even though the terms of that visibility were 
considerably ‘flattened’ by both court and media (Bain and Nash, 2007: 27-30). 
Similarly, the ruling will likely deter future raids, even though it ultimately affirmed the 
state’s right to intrude upon queer sexual spaces.  Just as increased visibility of queer 
identities can usher in new forms of political freedom and enable more intensive 
regulation, discourses of ‘limited thinking’ have contradictory and unpredictable effects. 
The remedy for ‘limited thinking’ is not ‘better thinking,’ but rather a critical 
interrogation of the conditions that make such rationalities possible. The task is not only 
to expose the process by which discourses of ignorance are mobilized as techniques of 
governance, but to provide a basis upon which to challenge the socio-political 
consequences and ‘truth effects’ of such modes of thought (Valverde, 2003: 7). If, as 
Michael Taussig argues, ‘knowing what not to know’ is one of the most powerful forms 
of social knowledge, then paying attention to discourses of unknowing is crucial for 
contesting normative power-relations (Taussig, 1999: 2). The challenge then, is to seek 
new ways of disrupting the conditions of knowing and unknowing, to continuously 
unsettle the terms by which law claims both knowledge and ignorance.  
 
 
i Many thanks to Davina Cooper, Mariana Valverde, Antu Sorainen, Niiti Simmonds, 
Toni Johnson, Ryan Kelly and two anonymous reviewers for helpful feedback on earlier 
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drafts.  Special thanks to the Toronto Women’s Bathhouse Committee, Chanelle Gallant, 
Kyle Rae and Frank Addario for sharing case files. I am grateful for funding from the 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Commonwealth 
Scholarship Commission of the United Kingdom, and AHRC (Arts and Humanities 
Research Council) Research Centre for Law, Gender and Sexuality. 
ii The Toronto Women’s Bathhouse Committee was founded in 1998 by a group of queer 
activists who wanted to create spaces for women to have ‘casual, kinky and public sex’ 
with other women. The Committee has since hosted several events each year, renting gay 
male bathhouses (which have existed for decades in Toronto) for use by women and 
transgender persons. Similar women’s bathhouses have been hosted in other Canadian 
cities, including Hamilton and Halifax. See Gallant, Chanelle and Loralee Gillis (2001) 
'Pussies Bite Back: The Story of the Women's Bathhouse Raid', Torquere: Journal of the 
Lesbian and Gay Studies Association 3: 152-167.  
iii This is not to diminish the significance of cases where same-sex acts among women 
were punished by criminal law in Europe and North America. See, Crompton, Louis 
(1981/2) 'The Myth of Lesbian Impunity: Capital Laws from 1270 to 1791', Journal of 
Homosexuality 6 (1/2): 11-25, Robson, Ruthann (1990) 'Lesbianism in Anglo-European 
Legal History', Wisconsin Women's Law Journal 5: 1-42, Sorainen, Antu (2006) 
'Productive Trials: English and Finish Legislation and Conceptualisations of Same-Sex 
Sexualities in Course of Trials of Oscar Wilde, Maud Allan, Radclyffe Hall and Herb 
Grove, from 1885-1957', SQS - Journal for Queer Studies in Finland 1 (1): 17-38. 
iv The legal history of sodomy in Britain is itself characterized by wilful ignorance. Not 
only was sodomy described as ‘a crime not fit to be named’ but the decision to exclude 
women from the statue arose from a fear that verbalization of such acts would make 
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otherwise ignorant women aware of, and thereby more prone to engage in, such 
behaviour. See, Valverde, Mariana (2007) 'Bodies, Words, Identities: The Moving 
Targets of the Criminal Law', pp. 224-251 in M. Dubber & Farmer, L. (eds), Modern 
Histories of Crime and Punishment. Stanford, Stanford University Press, Arnup, 
Katherine (1989) '"Mothers Just Like Others": Lesbians, Divorce, and Child Custody in 
Canada', Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 3: 18-32. 
v Thanks to Mariana Valverde for bringing this point to my attention. 
vi The Toronto neighbourhood at the intersection of Church and Wellesley Streets is 
home to many gay-owned businesses, residences and community organizations, as well 
as the city’s annual Gay Pride Parade. While associated with the broader lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgender community, the area is primarily populated by gay men, 
particularly those who can afford its increasingly high rents. 
vii The report notes concerns about sexual harassment and assault by male guards against 
female prisoners, but nowhere is a direct reason given for the cross-gender ban. 
viii Police searches of transgender persons have been subsequently addressed in Ontario 
law; transgender persons can now choose between male or female officers for search 
purposes, see Chung, Matthew (2006) 'Ontario upholds transsexual rights', Globe and 
Mail May 25: A2.  
ix Curiously enough, the term ‘trans’ appears once in the ruling, perhaps another case of 
careless thinking, for it suggests the judge did not fully appreciate the implication of 
recognizing transgender identities.  Significantly, it is ‘trans’ and not ‘transgender’ or 
‘transsexual,’ as the latter terms would challenge more directly the search policy logic. 
‘Trans’ arguably functions as an empty signifier: a place-holder which denotes formal 
inclusion, but lacks substantive meaning.  
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